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Abstract 
In this paper, we contend that what to teach about scientific reasoning has been bedeviled 
by a lack of clarity about the construct. Drawing on the insights emerging from a cognitive 
history of science, we argue for a conception of scientific reasoning based on six ‘styles of 
scientific reasoning’. Each ‘style’ requires its own specific ontological and procedural entities, 
and invokes its own epistemic values and constructs. Consequently, learning science requires the 
development of not just content knowledge but, in addition, procedural knowledge, and 
epistemic knowledge. Previous attempts to develop a coherent account of scientific reasoning 
have neglected the significance of either procedural knowledge, epistemic knowledge, or both. In 
contrast, ‘styles of reasoning’ do recognize the need for all three elements of domain-specific 
knowledge, and the complexity and situated nature of scientific practice. Most importantly, 
‘styles of reasoning’ offer science education a means of valorizing the intellectual and cultural 
contribution that the sciences have made to contemporary thought, an argument  that is sorely 
missing from common rationales for science education.  Second, the construct of ‘styles of 
reasoning’ offers a more coherent conceptual schema for the contruct of scientific reasoning – 
one of the major goals of any education in the sciences.  
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Introduction 
The project of this paper is to offer a contribution towards improving our understanding 
of the construct of scientific reasoning used in science education. While the study of scientific 
reasoning is far from new, this review and these reflections are required for several reasons. 
First, ever since its inception, one justification for science education has been that it might instill 
the disciplinary habits of mind of the scientist (Chinn & Malhotra, 2003; DeBoer, 1997; Dewey, 
1916; Layton, 1973; Turner, 1927). In contemporary society, such arguments have become even 
more pre-eminent (Economist, 2014; Gilbert, 2005; Hanushek & Woessmann, 2015; Hill, 2008; 
National Research Council, 2008, 2012a). Hill (2008), for instance, argues that the societies that 
sustain their competitive edge in the coming decades will be ‘post-scientific’ societies. In such a 
society, skills that are highly valued will be the ability to draw on a range of disciplinary 
knowledge, to think creatively, and to evaluate and critique new ideas. Employers will require 
individuals who, while having a core understanding of scientific and technical principles, have 
the ability to communicate and synthesize knowledge in an original manner (National Research 
Council, 2008, 2012a) using the higher order reasoning skills of evaluation, synthesis, and 
critique. If so, as Hill (2008) argues, it is important to “emphasize what we want” lest we get 
“what we emphasize” (p. 9). When it comes to the skill of reasoning scientifically, however, we 
argue that science education has suffered from a lack of clarity about “what we want”. The result 
is a substantial gap between the goals of science education and the classroom reality such that 
both the sciences, and its students, have been short-changed. 
One consequence of the failure to define what is meant by scientific reasoning has been 
an over-emphasis on content knowledge (Layton, 1973; Reddy, 1979; Turner, 1927; Weiss, 
Pasley, Sean Smith, Banilower, & Heck, 2003) – a feature which is reflected in the external 
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assessment of much school science (Au, 2007; Osborne and Ratcliffe, 2002). Indeed, the rise of 
demands for accountability in education and state testing has led to an even more deeply 
entrenched emphasis on content (Hout & Elliott, 2011; Wilson & Bertenthal, 2005.). In the case 
of assessment in science, many items make lower-level cognitive demands of recall and 
comprehension (Osborne and Ratcliffe, 2002;(Pellegrino, Chudowsky, & Glaser, 2001; 
Shavelson, Baxter, & Pine, 1991; Wilson & Bertenthal, 2005) failing to test higher-order analytic 
and reasoning skills. This outcome, we argue, is a consequence of the lack of a coherent account 
of the goals of the sciences, the reasoning they use, and their achievements within the field of 
science education.
1
 In the absence of such an account, the field has belittled and distorted the 
accomplishments of the sciences and their epistemic success to a singular algorithmic process – 
‘the scientific method’ – an account that grossly misrepresents and undervalues scientific work 
and its cultural contribution.
2
 
In this paper, we argue for a conception of scientific reasoning drawn from the neglected 
field of scholarship undertaken in the cognitive history of the sciences which shows that there is 
no single form of reasoning in the sciences, but rather, six distinct styles of reasoning. The notion 
of ‘styles of reasoning’ has emerged from a body of scholarship in the history of science that has 
identified the major forms of argument within science and their distinctive features (Crombie, 
                                               
1  The plural ‘sciences’ is chosen deliberately throughout as each of the sciences invokes different 
styles of reasoning and different ontic entities. Indeed, we would argue that the field would 
benefit by talking not about the ‘science’ curriculum but the ‘sciences’ curriculum to emphasize 
the fact that science is characterized by its diversity of thought rather than any singular unity. 
2  This comment is not true of the Next Generation Science Standards (Achieve, 2012) which have 
broadened the notion of what it means to do science by introducing a set of 8 practices which 
are common across the sciences. 
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1994; Davidson, 2004; Hacking, 1992, 2012; Nersessian, 1995; Netz, 1999; Tweney, 2001). 
Each style of reasoning is distinguished by its own entities, procedures, and epistemic constructs. 
Consequently, scientific reasoning is dependent not on one, but rather, three forms of 
knowledge. These are: 
 Content knowledge of the appropriate domain-specific concepts – that is the ontological 
entities that science uses to reason with;  
 Procedural knowledge which is knowledge of the procedures and associated constructs 
that science uses to establish it claims to know; and  
 Epistemic knowledge which is knowledge of the epistemic constructs and values and how 
these are used to justify science’s claims to know.3  
The common stance of cognitive historians is that the modes of reasoning within science 
are better determined by taking a descriptive, naturalistic examination of the outcomes of 
scientific reasoning, rather than by empirical investigations of how humans reason. Such modes 
of thinking are not an innate quality of what it means to be human, but rather, are entrenched in 
the language, belief systems, and world-views we hold.  Consequently, they are assimilated by 
each of us from the interpersonal interaction that arises from simply being in that culture 
(Vygotsky, 1978). In short, all cognitive science can do is illuminate the way we reason but not 
how such reasoning has emerged or what it has achieved. Thus, like Fodor (1983), we share his 
skepticism about the ability of cognitive science to determine the workings of the central 
processor or intra-personal processes of the human mind. Rather, we believe that such attempts 
                                               
3
  To exemplify their distinct nature, an ontological entity e.g., a wave, gene or element is distinct from 
a procedural entity such as a variable, a measurement error, or procedure such replication which, in 
turn, is distinct from an epistemic entity such as a theory, a hypothesis or an inductive argument.  
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will simply discover the specific ways of thinking that are already culturally embedded. Thus our 
position follows a long line of American pragmatists such as Pierce, Dewey, and Rorty whose 
concern is not with revealing truth per se but with the cultural modes of thought that have 
evolved, what makes them distinctive, and moreover, what makes them successful.  
Using the notion of ‘styles of reasoning’, we then explore what this particular conception 
offers – not least that there is more to scientific thinking than ‘the scientific method’; and that 
scientific reasoning requires not just a knowledge of its domain-specific constructs but also a 
knowledge of a set of procedural and epistemic constructs. Perhaps, most importantly, as we 
shall argue, what ‘styles of reasoning’ offers is a cultural argument for the value of an education 
in the sciences – a long overdue riposte to the dominant, neo-liberal, economic imperative. We 
then show how this perspective illuminates the nature of the confusion that has existed, and still 
exists, around the construct of scientific reasoning. For instance, at different points in time, the 
conception of scientific reasoning has been dominated by the views of psychologists, who have 
seen it as requiring a set of domain-general heuristics; philosophers, who have sought to 
characterize reasoning in terms of a set of normative and epistemic features; and sociologists, 
who have sought to characterize it as a collective activity undertaken as a body of socio-cultural 
practices. In contrast to any one of these accounts, each of which identifies certain specific 
features of scientific reasoning, ‘styles of reasoning’ offers a coherent, domain-specific vision of 
both the entities required and the different forms of reasoning that the sciences have developed. 
We then finish by exploring the implications – in particular, how this framework offers a means 
of escaping from the tyranny of content.  
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Styles of Scientific Reasoning 
The goal of scientific reasoning is to answer three specific questions about the material 
world (National Research Council, 2012b, Osborne, 2011). These are the questions of: 
1. What exists? (the ontic question); 
2. Why it happens?(the causal question); and 
3. How do we know? (the epistemic question).4  
How scientists commonly develop and construct answers to these questions is, we 
contend, best found in the neglected work of cognitive historians of science. Two major 
contributions to this field are Reviel Netz’s study of the origin of Greek mathematics (Netz, 
1999) and Alistair Crombie’s three-volume study of Styles of thinking in the European Tradition 
(1994). Cognitive historians argue, first, that human reasoning is much better understood using a 
historical approach and by taking an external perspective that looks at the products of that 
reasoning; second, that there are no general, universal rules of reasoning. Instead, the cognitive 
tools used by science have emerged historically as a contingent, cultural product of specific 
contexts—an accident of history—and, given an alternate historical narrative, may well have 
existed in a different form, or not at all. 
Using such an approach, Crombie’s examination of scientific thought since the Greeks 
reveals not one but six distinct ‘styles of reasoning’ and that “the history of science in the 
                                               
4  There is also the question of ‘what can we do with such knowledge?’ but this is a technological 
question. 
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European tradition is the history of vision and argument” (Crombie, 1994, p3).5 The success of 
science can then be attributed to the development of cognitive tools, resources and styles of 
reasoning that have been used to argue for a set of ideas – ideas that have initially seemed 
absurd, such as the idea that day and night are caused by a spinning Earth and not a moving Sun, 
or the idea that the Continents were once one, or the idea that all species on the Earth have 
evolved over millions of years. Specifically, Crombie argues that the styles of scientific 
reasoning are: 
1. Mathematical Deduction, which is the use of mathematics to represent the world and for 
deductive argument. The Greeks were the first to initiate this form of reasoning with the 
work of Euclid, Pythagoras, and others. The representation of physical phenomena by 
numerical quantities or algebraic symbols is something that is key to all the sciences. All 
kinds of entities are depicted in a mathematical form, and mathematics is very much one of 
the major languages of the sciences used as a means of making deductive predictions both in 
the sciences and engineering. 
2. Experimental Evaluation, which is the use of empirical investigation to establish patterns, 
differentiate one form of object from another, and to test the predictions of hypothetical 
models. Galileo is commonly seen as the key figure who initiated this style of reasoning 
testing his hypothesis that all masses would fall with equal acceleration by dropping two 
                                               
5  We must emphasize that what is presented here is an argument for the nature of science in the 
Western tradition that forms the basis of the school curriculum across most if not all of the 
globe. We recognize that there are good arguments that this fails to present the nature of 
thinking and reasoning about the material world offered by other cultures – see for instance 
Medin and Bang (2014). 
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cannonballs of different sizes from the tower of Pisa.
6
  Since Galileo, experimental 
exploration has become a key method in nearly all the sciences. Empirical evidence is used to 
test whether scientific ideas can be falsified and to substantiate or critique arguments.7 Only 
those ideas that survive such tests are the ones that we hold to be true. 
3. Hypothetical Modeling, which is the construction of analogical and hypothetical models to 
represent the world. Science advances by developing explanatory models for what scientists 
observe.8 Indeed, some would argue that this is the primary goal of science. Analogical 
models are used to represent things which are too large to imagine (the Solar System), or too 
small to see such as the cell or the Bohr model of the atom. Models, such as the kinetic 
theory of matter, are used to make predictions and are now commonly built with computers 
to simulate the possible behavior of the world, e.g., climate models. Models and 
representations are then central to providing the tools and heuristics necessary to reasoning 
how the world might behave. 
4. Categorization and Classification, which is the ordering of variety by comparison and 
taxonomy. Establishing what exists is a fundamental aspect of science. Many scientists 
engage solely in the process of classification – for instance, distinguishing rocks, animals, 
particles, and chemicals from each other. Defining what exists, and the concepts that we use 
                                               
6  There is no evidence that Galileo actually performed this experiment but there is a record that 
he performed an experiment to show the same point empirically demonstrating that the period 
of a pendulum was independent of the mass of the bob. 
7  Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
8  Schauble, Leona. (1996). The development of scientific reasoning in knowledge-rich contexts. 
Developmental Psychology, 32(1), 102-119.  
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to talk about them, has been key to building our understanding of the world – not just in 
biology, but in chemistry where the development of the periodic table was totally dependent 
on establishing the elemental nature of the material world, and in physics for distinguishing 
concepts such as heat and temperature, mass and weight, and energy and power. Both field 
work and experimental exploration are vital means of establishing what exists as, until we 
agree on the ontic entities that exist, there can be no common language to reason about such 
entities.  
5.  Probabilistic Reasoning, which is the statistical analysis of regularities in populations, the 
identification of patterns, and the calculus of their probability. The determination of patterns 
is an essential feature of the sciences and the basis, for instance, of the science of 
epidemiology. For example, the link between skin cancer and sunshine was established by a 
data that showed a linear decrease in incidence of skin cancer per thousand members of the 
population with increasing latitude (Findlay, 1928). Likewise the current concern about the 
Zika virus emerges from studies suggesting correlation rather than any understanding of a 
causal mechanism. Scientists, such as Gauss and Poisson, are the individuals who have made 
major contributions to establishing the epistemic criteria used to reason about the existence 
of patterns, and a range of methods for describing variation and the chances of its occurrence. 
6. Historical-Based Evolutionary Reasoning, which is the construction of historical accounts of 
the derivation of the development of species, the Earth, the solar system, the universe, the 
elements and more. Attempts to explain the origins of the material world and its features are 
a major element of reasoning in the sciences. They rely on constructing theories about what 
might have happened in the past. Darwin’s ideas emerged from his detailed observation of 
the variations of patterns that exist in nature and asking how such differences could have 
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come to be. In astrophysics, evolutionary accounts have been developed by constructing 
mathematical models that would account for what we observe. Such theories have succeeded 
because t they have been the best possible inferences for what exists, and notably not because 
there has been any application of ‘the scientific method’. 
As Hacking (2012) argues, “such styles of reasoning do not answer to some other, higher, 
or deeper, standard of truth and reason than their own” (p. 605). These forms of reasoning exist 
because they have been, and still are, successful in answering the ontological, causal, and 
epistemic questions that are the focus of the sciences. They are good not because they detect the 
truth; rather, they are good because they are successful. And, because of their success, “they 
have become part of our standards for what it is to find out the truth” (p. 605, (Hacking, 2012).  
Importantly though, each of these forms of reasoning brings into being a distinct set of 
ontic, procedural, and epistemic entities that are required to perform their reasoning – examples 
of which are offered in Table 1. Procedural entities are used as cognitive tools which are 
essential to engaging in that style of reasoning, e.g., the notion of a variable which is central to 
experimental exploration, while epistemic knowledge is a knowledge, for instance, of the forms 
of argument used in science, or the nature of a scientific hypothesis.
9
  Both of these forms of 
knowledge are necessary for justifying how we know what we know – that is, how we reason in 
the sciences. Thus, the evolutionary account of human development introduces the ontic 
                                               
9  Cognitive tool are important constructs that are used to reason with. For instance, for Greek 
mathematics it is the diagram that exploits human visual cognitive resources. Likewise, physicists 
use ray diagrams to reason about the behavior of lenses, or free body diagrams to reason about 
the effects of forces. Chemists use molecular models to reason about the behavior of molecules 
while biologists use the construct of a gene to reason about the effects of breeding and 
inheritance.  
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concepts of natural selection, adaptation, and genes. Experimental exploration, which emerges in 
the 16
th
 Century, develops the procedural notion of a variable and the need for their identification 
and control. Greek Mathematics makes the case for the epistemic importance of deduction as a 
form of argument. Notably, each of these modes of thought is associated with a legendary hero –
Euclid and Pythagoras with Greek Mathematics, Galileo with the introduction of experiment and 
hypothetical modeling, Linnaeus and Mendelev with categorization and classification, Poisson 
and John Snow with statistical and correlational thinking, and Darwin and Wegner with 
evolutionary thinking. That it is possible to identify a name with the achievements of one style of 
reasoning is an indicator of both its distinctive nature and its significance. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In the first column of Table 1 are the ontic entities that science has invented to reason 
with. Thus the Copernican model of the solar system requires planets to move in ‘orbits’; the 
Torricellian explanation of the barometer requires the existence of a ‘vacuum’; Pasteur’s model 
to explain the rotting of food requires the invention of ‘microbes’; Maxwell’s equations to 
explain the velocity of light introduces an ‘ether’. That there is something to be explained is first 
dependent on the categorization and classification of the variety of the material world – the 
fourth of Crombie’s styles of reasoning. Darwin’s work, for example, was totally dependent on 
the notion of a species introduced by Linnaeus, and Lyell’s historic 1815 map of the geology of 
Great Britain was dependent on the idea that there are distinct categories of rock that have 
different origins and different histories. The categorization of the world – that is, the ordering of 
variety by comparison and taxonomy – is essential to the advancement of the sciences. The 
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ability to then see patterns is dependent on the analysis and classification of regularities. Snow’s 
foundational epidemiological work on the causes of cholera typifies the fifth of Crombie’s styles 
of reasoning – probabilistic and statistical thinking. Demonstrating the validity of any given 
explanatory model may depend on deductive mathematical reasoning (style 1), arguments from 
data obtained by experimental observation (style 2), or inferential reasoning as to the most likely 
possibility, as in the case of Darwin’s argument for evolution, or Wegner’s argument for 
continental drift (style 6). 
The second column of Table 1 represents the procedural entities that support reasoning 
about these entities. Most familiar is the notion of dependent and independent variables and the 
control of variables strategy. However, the skilled experimenter also has a diverse knowledge of 
sources of error and techniques for their minimization and the statistical techniques for reducing 
the the possibility that any empirical finding occurring by chance. More recently such procedural 
knowledge has been elaborated as a set of ‘concepts of evidence’ (Gott, Duggan, & Roberts, 
2008) and it is a feature of the PISA framework for assessing scientific literacy (OECD, 2012).  
Arguments for any of the models are, in turn, dependent on epistemic criteria that are an 
intrinsic feature of any given style of reasoning. Thus probabilistic reasoning, of the form used to 
establish the existence of the Higgs Boson, uses, as a criterion of justified belief, the idea that the 
probability of the event observed at CERN being anything other than the Higgs Boson was so 
low as to be virtually impossible. Taxonomic reasoning rests on the application of criteria to 
demarcate one entity from another – for instance, the classification of species depends on the 
criterion that a species can be demarcated by how they reproduce. More recently, the field has 
adopted genetic criteria for its arguments. Experimental exploration is highly dependent on the 
notion of a variable and an epistemic belief that controlling all but the salient variable – an idea 
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often communicated in elementary science as a ‘fair test’ – can enable science to identify causal 
relationships. Mathematical reasoning is reliant on the epistemic belief that it is acceptable to 
represent physical quantities in idealized symbolic forms (e.g., frictionless planes, point masses) 
that can be used to make a deductive argument.  
Moreover, the framework of ‘styles of reasoning’ shows that a key epistemic element 
missing from the account of scientific reasoning offered by school science has been the role of 
explanatory models in science (Cartwright, 1983; Giere, Bickle, & Maudlin, 2006; Suppes, 
1960). Yet, the construction of models (style 3) is “a signature of much research in the sciences” 
(Nercessian, 2008), a standard part of its practice. Experimentation, similarly, is not just a matter 
of knowing how to get reliable data – which is a procedural issue – but also why reliability is 
important – which is an epistemic issue. To conduct an experiment, undoubtedly, it is essential to 
have some understanding of what a variable is, and which variables might be controlled. Why it 
is necessary to control variables, however, is an epistemic construct. Further arguments for the 
importance of epistemic knowledge are the findings of research (Reiner & Gilbert, 2000) that 
suggest that it also plays a crucial role in the production of new knowledge. Thus engaging in 
scientific reasoning requires a body of epistemic knowledge which needs to be taught explicitly 
to students – the third element of a knowledge of the sciences whose significance is justified by 
the perspective of styles of reasoning.  
What Crombie’s work also shows is that establishing the validity of any hypothesis may 
depend on a hypothetico-deductive argument from premises to conclusion, but it could also be an 
abductive argument that it is the best explanation, or an inductive argument about the patterns 
that exist in nature. Yet the simplistic model of scientific reasoning pervasive to most curricula 
would suggest that the sciences draw solely on hypothetico-deductive arguments captured by the 
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notion of ‘the scientific method’ (Bauer, 1992; Windschitl, Thompson, & Braaten, 2008). This 
‘myth’ does the sciences a disservice in two ways. First, the sciences are better characterized by 
their ontological, methodological, and epistemic diversity (Baird, Scerri, & McIntyre, 2006; 
Cartwright, 1983; Mayr, 2004) rather than their commonality – a point which has been made 
consistently by scholarship within the field of science education over the past two decades 
(Martins & Ryder, 2015; Rudolph, 2000; Van Dijk, 2014). Second, the idea that there is some 
singular algorithmic procedure responsible for the production of scientific knowledge 
undervalues the nature and diversity of creative thought that has revolutionized our 
understanding of the material world over the past 450 years sustaining  the misconception that 
there is a single form of reasoning unifying the sciences. 
Our view is that, over the past two decades, the field has been wrestling with how to 
incorporate epistemic knowledge within the science curriculum. The movement to teach more 
about the nature of science (Lederman, 1992, 2007; Matthews, 1994) can be seen as one such 
attempt. Coupled with empirical evidence suggesting that epistemic knowledge is perceived as a 
significant element of any science education (Osborne, Ratcliffe, Collins, Millar, & Duschl, 
2003), epistemic knowedge has become a more prominent feature of contemporary curricula. 
Indeed, the previous version of the English national curriculum (Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority, 2007) included a specific component entitled ‘How Science Works’, while the 
framework for K-12 science education outlines eight epistemic practices which should be an 
essential element of the curriculum (National Research Council, 2012b) – though notably this 
document does not define what are the specific elements of either procedural or epistemic 
knowledge. In contrast, the PISA assessment framework for 2015 (OECD, 2012) does 
incorporate epistemic knowledge defining it as: a) a knowledge of the constructs and defining 
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features essential to the process of knowledge building in science; and b) the role of these 
constructs in justifying the knowledge produced by science.  
Notably, what all these attempts lack, however, is a coherent rationale for the 
incorporation of such elements other than the argument that such knowledge is essential to be an 
informed and participatory citizen.  What is missing is some broad picture that conveys not only 
something of the variety of the forms of reasoning of the sciences, but also, and above all, why 
its practice and development constitutes such an epistemic achievement.  While, in and of 
themselves, the practices in the NGSS, offer some insight into the epistemic activities conducted 
by scientists, they offer neither a big picture of the distinctive forms of reasoning in the sciences 
nor their outcomes – outcomes which have changed the way we think as a culture.  In what ways 
then, do ‘styles of reasoning’ offer an improvement? 
Why styles of reasoning?  
A focus on styles of reasoning offers three important advances for science education. 
First, it helps to undermine the hegemony of the scientific method (Bauer, 1992; Windschitl et 
al., 2008) for ‘the scientific method’ draws on only two of the six forms of reasoning used in 
science – that is style 3 (hypothetical modeling) and style 2 (experimental exploration). As a 
corollary, students are offered an impoverished account of scientific thinking. Second, as we 
have shown,  it demonstrates unequivocally that scientific reasoning is dependent, not on one 
form of knowledge but three – all of which need to be taught explicitly. Finally, it offers a better 
rationale for educating all students in science rather than the habitual and dominant economic 
imperative or the argument based in education for citizenship – an argument to which we now 
attend in some detail.  
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To start, the economic argument is highly flawed because there is no universal shortage 
of individuals with STEM qualifications (Salzman, Kuehn, & Lowell, 2013; Xie & Killewald, 
2012). Moreover, it is a highly unconvincing argument for the overwhelming majority of 
students who have no aspiration to pursue the study of science or a STEM career. Furthermore, 
no other curriculum subject has such a propaedeutic function as its primary goal.  Why then 
should science be saddled with such a responsibility?  However, in the absence of strong 
contending arguments, the economic imperative has filled a vacuum to become the dominant 
argument for the value of science education.
10
 The argument that a knowledge of the sciences is 
necessary to be an effective citizen, in contrast, does have universal and utilitarian validity. 
However, at the personal level of decision making it must compete with arguments that other 
competencies are more valuable for citizenship, such as financial literacy, computer literacy or 
health education. In short, what is it about science that makes it more deserving than other forms 
of knowledge, such that it not only earns itself a place at the curriculum table, but one alongside 
mathematics and a first language? Rudolph and Horibe (2015) make a stronger argument that 
science education should develop a “second-order ability” to “locate and use expert knowledge 
as a means to public ends” (p. 12) for the purpose of what they call ‘civic engagement’ – both to 
evaluate the application of scientific knowledge and to consider what forms of knowledge it 
might be valuable to produce.  This is fundamentally a pragmatic argument – that such 
knowledge is necessary to be a responsible, participating member of a democratic society.   As 
such, it is ‘a programmatic concept’ (Norris, Phillips and Burns, 2014) defined by elements that 
                                               
10  For example, the recently published Royal Society document Vision for Science and Mathematics 
Education (The Royal Society, 2014) singularly fails to make any argument for science education 
other than its economic value. 
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embody a valued direction or a desired goal – in this case that the outcome of science education 
should enable individuals to engage in civic considerations of both the application and the 
production of scientific knowledge.  While many, including the authors of this paper, find such 
arguments convincing, they are contentious in two ways.  First, others may not agree about the 
goals.  For instance, the modest changes in the UK curriculum to incorporate an element on 
‘How Science Works’ in 2000 met with considerable opposition (Perks, 2006).  Second, even if 
there is agreement about the goals, there may be disagreement about the means by which they 
are to be achieved.  Indeed, despite numerous attempts to argue for the importance of such 
programmatic goals e.g., (Aikenhead, 1994; Fuller, 1997; Millar & Osborne, 1998; Ziman, 
1994), and strong empirical evidence that such goals require a body of knowledge and 
understanding that differs significantly from the content of most school science curricula (Ryder, 
2001), no coherent consensus has emerged about the means to achieve such an end. 
Missing in all this discussion of the rationales for science education is the cultural 
argument that the sciences offer some of the “best that is worth knowing” (Spencer, 1884). This 
is an argument that: 
“the distinguishing feature of modern Western societies is science and technology. Science 
and technology are the most significant determinants in our culture. In order to decode our 
culture and enrich our participation - this includes protest and rejection - an 
appreciation/understanding of science is desirable” (p. 339). Cossons (1993)  
It is this form of argument that is used to justify all other curriculum subjects that are 
seen as distinct and valued forms of knowledge (Bereiter, 2002; Committee on the Objectives of 
a General Education in a Free Society, 1945; Hirst, 1965; Hirst & Peters, 1970) – and it is only 
this argument that is sufficiently sound and defensible to justify teaching science to all children. 
Why? Because, unlike the citizenship argument, the cultural argument has a much less 
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contentious programmatic objective as, while the choice of what might be taught is a reflection 
of the values of the society, such choices do not embody a program of action. Rather, the theory 
of plate tectonics, the law of conservation of energy, or adaption of species to their environment 
simply aims to capture the best description of the material world we can offer. As expressed by 
the Havard Committee “our culture depends in part on an inherited view of man and society 
which it is the function, though not the only function, of education to pass on
11…To  study the 
past is immensely to enrich the meaning of the present and at the same time to clarify it by the 
simplification of the writings and the issues which have been winnowed from history.” (p69, 
Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society, 1945).  Or, as stated by 
Hector, a leading character in Bennet’s play The History Boys (Bennett, 2004), the function of 
education is to “Pass the parcel. That's sometimes all you can do. Take it, feel it, and pass it on. 
Not for me, not for you, but for someone, somewhere, one day. Pass it on, boys.”   
The question, of course, is what is that the sciences offer that is so valuable that is worth 
passing on? What does it mean to ‘appreciate’ science as a form of thought and a ‘way of 
knowing’?  The sciences themselves have singularly failed to develop such an argument seeing it 
as a task for the popularisers of science and often treating such work with disdain. And, while 
many of these have written notable accounts of the specific sciences e.g., Stephen Jay Gould, 
Asimov, Carl Sagan, Richard Dawkins, there is no overall, useable larger picture.  Yet, if school 
science has to leave students with more than a miscellany of facts (Cohen, 1952) and a sense that 
the production of more knowledge simply requires the application of a standardized algorithmic 
method, there has to be an argument for its cultural significance which is more substantive than 
the argument made by Cossons cited above.    
                                               
11 Emphasis added. 
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This, we contend, is what ‘style of reasoning’ offers.  For, as Bereiter argues, a liberal 
education (Bereiter, 2002) is an enculturation into a world of ideas, learning how to use and 
reason with those ideas enables the individual to participate in the discourse of modern society, 
and thus intiates “ the young into a culture which transcends the particularities of their own 
social and ethnic backgrounds” (p. 12), or, as put by Hirst (1965),  “to learn to see, to experience 
the world in a way otherwise unknown, and thereby come to have mind in a fuller sense" (p. 
125). If so, we are forced to ask what are the features of scientific thought that makes it so 
valuable? What are the scientific ideas that have transformed our understanding of the world? 
Attempts to define the distinguishing elements of science in terms of a set of transcedent features 
(Lederman, 2007; Osborne et al., 2003) have failed to gain any traction within science education 
(Duschl & Grandy, 2013) – a fate which we would suggest is likely to befall the cross-cutting 
concepts of the Framework for K-12 Science Education (National Research Council, 2012b).
12
 
Where then is the coherent vision of the cultural contribution that makes science an 
unquestionable element of the education of all children from K-12? To argue that the sciences 
are an essential foundation of a liberal education, the form of knowledge has to be specified in 
ways that are more than a collecton of information e.g, (Hirsch, 1987). Instead, there has to be a 
framework or narrative which enables students to grasp some understanding of the complex 
conceptual schemes that the sciences have achieved, and the different types of reasoning they 
afford (Hirst, 1965). It is this conception that students need to acquire and to make part of 
themselves, and moreover, which is needed to engage with, and evaluate, the science they 
                                               
12  As we shall show, this is because they focus on only one element of science – its epistemic 
practices and do not offer a coherent conceptual vision of all the forms of knowledge required 
by the sciences. 
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encounter in their daily lives. For instance, many of the findings of the sciences are framed in 
terms of probabilities – from the likelihood that it will rain to an assessment of the risk of dying 
from surgery for a given operation. Thus probabilistic reasoning (style 5) needs to be a core 
feature of any science curriculum rather than a marginal or, more commonly, a missing feature. 
However, both the sciences and scientists seem to suffer from collective amnesia when it 
comes to the magnitude of their achievements. Science, for instance, has transformed our 
understanding of who we are, what we are, and where we are. No longer is the planet on which 
we reside the center of the universe but a rather ordinary, dull object orbiting a sun, which is 
itself a star and part of a collection of 100,000 other stars which form just one of billions of 
galaxies. Moreover, other than the hydrogen and helium in our bodies, most of the elements from 
which we are constituted were synthesized in some star billions of years ago. Perhaps even more 
astounding is the idea that every cell in our bodies carries a chemically coded message about 
how to reproduce each of us. How then has such knowledge been achieved? By engaging in 
specific ‘styles of reasoning’ – a perspective which provides both the sciences and school 
science with what has long been missing – a vision of the sciences’ achievements and the 
distinctive nature of its thought. In short a cultural argument for the value of school science.  
Some Further Insights provided by “Styles of Reasoning”  
In examining how the major ideas about scientific reasoning have developed, the 
impression we have often gained is that of the Indian fable of the blind men studying the 
elephant. Each new approach has pointed towards one or more of the features of scientific 
reasoning, but never have the components been drawn together to provide a complete and 
coherent picture. It is impossible in this paper to review or discuss all the attempts that have been 
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made to address the construct of scientific reasoning and its implications for teaching science. 
Rather, to illustrate the partial nature of any one perspective, we have selected one strand of 
work that has attempted to address the challenge – the scholarship undertaken by psychologists. 
Drawing on the notion of ‘styles of reasoning’ we show the limitations of viewing a cognitive 
process through one particular lens. We then turn to examine the notion of scientific practices 
embodied in the recent K-12 Framework for Science Education (NRC, 2012). In doing so, our 
goal is to show how, seen from the perspective of styles of reasoning, the nature of the 
weaknesses of such approaches becomes more evident. 
The Psychological Approach to Scientific Reasoning: A Partial Perpective 
Many of the attempts to define scientific reasoning have presented it as a knowledge-
independent skill, or, as expressed by Inhelder and Piaget (1958), a facility to be seen as 
“liberated from particular contexts” (p. 331). Another version of this is seen among 
psychologists who commonly take a ‘nothing-special view’ (Simon, 1966) arguing that general 
reasoning abilities can account for the main characteristics of scientific reasoning, and that these 
are more important as they are transferable. While most psychologists today admit that 
reasoning is knowledge-dependent (Willingham, 2008; Zimmerman, 2007), many have 
continued to study domain-general reasoning processes in knowledge-lean tasks.  
For instance, a major contribution has been made by Klahr and Dunbar (1988) who have 
argued, from their detailed studies, that scientists work in dual spaces of hypothesis generation 
and experimental investigation. This conception was later extended to include a third space of 
evidence evaluation (Klahr & Carver, 1995). Klahr and Carver saw that these three spaces have 
both a domain-general and a domain-specific focus – a conception which is summarized in Table 
2. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Klahr’s program of research has been dominated by a focus on students’ abilities to 
engage in hypothesis generation, experimental design, and evidence evaluation in the context of 
experimental inquiry. Along with others, a particular focus has been the ability to control 
variables (Klahr & Li, 2005; Klahr, Zimmerman, & Jirout, 2011; Kuhn, 1991; Shayer, Wylam, 
Adey, & Kuchemann, 1979). Yet this particular form of reasoning is only one of the six styles of 
reasoning common in the sciences. In addition, in two extensive reviews of the nature of 
scientific reasoning (Zimmerman, 2000, 2007), Zimmerman notably excludes the study of 
hypothesis generation (A and D) from her reviews, suggesting that this cognitive operation is of 
less interest because of its domain-specific character when the reality is that it is core feature of 
science! Indeed, many would argue that it is the defining activity of science (Crombie, 1994; 
Lehrer & Schauble, 2006; Nercessian, 2008; Oakeshott, 1933). Instead, both Zimmerman and 
Klahr and Li (2005) emphasize the importance of domain-general approaches – although 
Zimmerman does acknowledge that “understanding the development of scientific thinking would 
be incomplete without studies in which participants take part in all phases of scientific 
discovery” (p. 192, Zimmerman, 2007). In so doing, she has avoided the issue of identifying 
what are the requisite knowledge bases for scientific reasoning.  
The contrary argument for the importance of domain-specific knowledge, made by 
Perkins and Salomon (1989), is that “general heuristics that fail to make contact with a rich 
domain-specific knowledge base are weak,” and that “a domain-specific knowledge base without 
general heuristics…is brittle” (p. 24). A similar argument was made by Koslowski (1996) in her 
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critique of Kuhn’s (1991) studies of individuals’ ability to engage in scientific reasoning. 
Koslowski argued that Kuhn had presented abstract puzzles that operationally defined causation 
in terms of co-variation and had ignored the role of theoretical constructs. As she elegantly 
stated: 
…to study scientific reasoning by asking subjects to evaluate co-variation evidence 
while ignoring what they already know about theory or mechanism is analogous to 
studying verbal memory by studying memory for meaningless nonsense syllables in order 
to control for the effects of meaning....Similarly, studying scientific reasoning by 
ignoring what we know about theory or mechanism might tell us something about the 
subject's ability to follow experimental instructions but not about scientific reasoning13. (p. 
39) 
In contrast, the ‘styles of reasoning’ framework offers a means of identifying both the 
distinctive forms of reasoning and the knowledge required for their undertaking. In so doing it 
offers a vision of the diversity of cognitive processes that science has developed to achieve its 
goals. Empirical support for the importance of domain-specific knowledge is provided by 
Schunn and Anderson (1999) who show how, lacking domain-specific knowledge, their 
undergraduate subjects “did not use theories in designing their experiments” and “did not relate 
their results to their experiments” (p. 368) concluding that what the scientist has acquired “is not 
just a matter of general reasoning ability.” Within domain-specific contexts, a considerable body 
of work has also been undertaken on the processes of evidence evaluation (Chinn & Brewer, 
1993; Howe, Tolmie, Duchak-Tanner, & Rattray, 2000; Koslowski, 1996). Likewise, Passmore 
                                               
13 Emphasis added 
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and Stewart (2002) have argued that “scientific practice is discipline specific” (p. 187), as have 
Sandoval and Morrison who conclude from their analysis of student explanations of Galapagos 
data “that epistemic and conceptual understanding are tightly interrelated” (p. 48).  
Undoubtedly, in the past six decades there has been a development in our understanding 
of what types of knowledge are required for reasoning in any domain – for instance in their 
revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy, Anderson and Krathwohl (2001) use not one but four 
categories to describe their knowledge dimension: factual knowledge, conceptual knowledge, 
procedural knowledge, and metacognitive knowledge. Likewise, Li and Shavelson (2001) have 
used a similar framework splitting knowledge into declarative knowledge (knowing what), 
procedural knowledge (knowing how), schematic knowledge (knowing why), and strategic 
knowledge (knowing when, where, and how knowledge applies) – a perspective that was 
influential in developing the NAEP 2009 framework for assessment in science. However, to date, 
none of these frameworks have offered a vision of how all of these three features of domain-
specific knowledge (content, procedural, and epistemic) are central to the performance and 
teaching of scientific reasoning.  In contrast, ‘styles’ do. 
Finally, we would contend that defining scientific reasoning as a domain-general 
cognitive skill is unsustainable. First, it misrepresents the nature of scientific reasoning. While 
individuals in everyday situations may use reasoning akin to that of scientists, such forms of 
reasoning cannot be used to define what is distinct about scientific reasoning. Second, arguments 
for the value of teaching domain-general reasoning within science are unsustainable as general 
reasoning does not have to be taught in science. Other school subjects may be better at teaching 
it. For example, moral reasoning could be taught in the humanities, deduction in mathematics, 
and problem-solving skills in technology.  
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An examination of the body of research conducted by psychologists, however, would 
suggest that they study either “hypothesizing”, “experimentation” or “evidence evaluation” 
separately and that their attempt to present a complete and coherent construct for scientific 
reasoning have avoided the issue of identifying the nature of the required domain-specfic 
knowledge.  Hence the debate over its nature remains unresolved (Tricot and Sweller, 2014, 
Fischer et al, 2014). While many of these features identitied have been ‘right’ in their own 
limited way, an overall picture of the diversity of reasoning and its knowledge-dependent nature, 
such as that offered by ‘styles of reasoning’, has been missing.  
Teaching Science as a Set of Practices 
What insights then can ‘styles of reasoning’ offer about the conception of the sciences 
advanced in the Framework for K-12 Science Education (NRC, 2012)? The model advanced 
within this document is that the sciences should be taught as a set of eight practices that are 
considered to be a distinctive feature of the sciences. The turn to practice has emerged from the 
social studies of the sciences, which has sought to portray the sciences as an activity undertaken 
by a community of practitioners who engage in a range of specific practices such as the asking of 
questions, developing models, analyzing and interpreting data, and engaging in argument from 
evidence, enable the justification of knowledge. As all of these practices require the use of 
scientific reasoning per se, such an approach clearly demands a greater emphasis on reasoning 
within the teaching and learning of science. In addition the argument in the Framework for K-12 
Science Education that the central project of science is the construction of theories and models, 
rather than empirical investigation, communicates an important and long neglected message that 
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the crowning glory of the sciences are theories (Harré, 1984) and that science is, first and 
foremost, a set of ideas about the material world (Oakeshott, 1933).  
The central model outlined in the Framework – see Fig 1 below – draws on a synthesis of 
empirical results emerging from the work of the psychologists Klahr and Dunbar (1988) and the 
philosopher Giere (1984; 2006). This model defines the activities of science in terms of three 
spheres of activity – one devoted to conducting investigations, one to developing explanations, 
and one to evaluating these ideas by comparing them with the empirical evidence. 
 
 
Figure 1. Model of science presented in the framework for science education (NRC, 2012, p. 45). 
There is much to commend in this model. For instance, evidence would suggest that these 
spheres of activity are not self-evident as studies of young children reveal that students often see 
the sciences differently (Driver, Leach, Millar, & Scott, 1996; Klahr & Carver, 1995; Millar, 
Lubben, Gott, & Duggan, 1995; Schauble, Klopfer, & Raghavan, 1991). Schauble et al. (1991), 
for instance, have identified that much investigatory work is conceptualized by students in terms 
of an ‘engineering frame’, in which the children do not set out to test ideas, but instead, to test a 
STYLES OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING   
  
29 
design (i.e., change variables to achieve ‘best’ or optimal conditions). Again, another study 
(Kind, Kind, Hofstein and Wilson, 2011) has demonstrated that students recognize the activity 
required for hypothesizing and experimentation more readily than that required for the evaluation 
of evidence. Furthermore, the Framework does acknowledge the centrality of critique 
(Henderson, Osborne, MacPherson, & Wild, 2015) – something which no other K-12 science 
curriculum of which we are aware manages to do. 
However, drawing on the concept of ‘styles of reasoning’ we see three weaknesses in the 
model of science offered by the Framework. First, its emphasis on engaging students in scientific 
practice places all of the stress on the activity itself and not its goals and purposes. For instance, 
one major reason for asking students to ‘analyze and interpret data’ is to develop an 
understanding that all data has a degree of uncertainty associated with its measurement, that 
there are standard ways of reducing the uncertainty, and that there may be competing 
interpretations of any given data set. Essentially that engaging in any practice has specific 
procedural and epistemic knowledge as its learning outcomes – outcomes which the framework 
notably fails to specify. Second, the emphasis on practice itself does not recognize that there is a 
set of distinct ‘styles of reasoning’ in science. Yes, scientists do engage in argument from 
evidence but the forms of argument may be deductive, inductive, or abductive, and, moreover, 
the ontological and procedural entities and epistemic criteria used are dependent on the specific 
domain of interest, and the relevant style of reasoning as shown by Table 1.  
A recognition that there are six distinct styles of reasoning in science would have enabled 
the Framework to make a more explicit statement about the diversity of reasoning in the 
sciences, its cognitive tools, and all of the forms of knowledge that are intrinsic to reasoning in 
the disparate sciences rather than just content knowledge. Seen in this light, it is strange that the 
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Framework makes an extensive statement about the disciplinary core ideas that should be the 
goal of learning science K-12 – that is the content knowledge – but only minimal statements 
about the other forms of knowledge which are so core to the practice of science. Moreover, the 
sciences are not a human activity bound together by a universal set of practices or a set of cross-
cutting themes, but rather, are a distinctive and diverse mode of thought defined by a set of 
‘styles of reasoning’.  
Third, we ask whether sustained engagement in scientific inquiry and the practices of the 
sciences can develop the overview of the sciences that the framework of ‘styles of reasoning’ 
suggest we should be seeking to attain – something that Duschl and Grandy (2013) believe it can 
attain?  Our view is that, while illuminating, practices focus on the actions that scientists take 
within the moment or short term.  What is needed is a ‘bigger picture’ of what this collection of 
activities achieves in the long term and its goals – that is what are the significant outcomes of 
engaging in scientific practices .  Currently, only ‘styles of reasoning’ offers such an overview of 
the nature and diversity of scientific rationality (Kusch, 2010). 
Finally, we must point to the fact that there is little evidence that professional scientists 
develop a deep understanding of the nature science by engaging in its practice. Imre Lakatos, 
once memorably commented that “most scientists tend to understand little more about science 
than fish do about hydrodynamics” (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1974)(p. 148). This would suggest 
that practice itself does not develop the overview of the sciences or the epistemic and procedural 
knowledge that should be the outcome of any education in the sciences.  
In contrast to the partial or, more often, absent conception of the nature of scientific 
reasoning, what styles of reasoning does offer is a more coherent and comprehensive vision of its 
nature and the knowledge bases required – in short, a comprehensive overview of the 
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contribution of European science to the intellectual capital and cognitive resources of 
contemporary society. Only when armed with this kind of vision and understanding, we contend, 
can the teacher act as an effective guide to the scientific landscape and its cultural achievement.  
Implications for Science Education 
What then are the implications for science education? First, we see it as essential that a 
primary goal of science education should be to introduce students to all of the six styles of 
reasoning, some of the ontic, procedural, and epistemic entities they use, and the scientific 
practices they deploy. More importantly, ‘styles of reasoning’ offers a framework for the choice 
of curriculum topics – as any coherent curriculum should insure that students experience each of 
the major types of reasoning that characterize the sciences. Essentially that scientists need to 
establish what entities exist by engaging in categorization and classification (style 4) to answer 
the primary ontological question of what exists. Then – to answer causal questions about the 
nature of the world – they construct hypothetical models of the world (style 3). To test their 
models and to establish what exists they engage in experimental exploration (style 2). Some of 
their models are best represented mathematically, as is much of the data they collect from 
experimentation (style 1). Some of their observations of the world lead to the identification of 
patterns and, by applying probabilistic thinking, they can predict with a degree of 
certainty/uncertainty what might happen (style 5). And finally, to explain how the world came to 
be as it is, they have to make abductive arguments about what might have happened in the past 
based on observations and/or simulations (style 6).  Each of these styles of reasoning illuminates 
how the sciences answers its epistemic question of how we know.  Any education in the sciences 
that omits one or more of these styles, then, would only offer a partial account of the cultural 
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achievements of the sciences. And, given that these styles of reasoning represent the major 
contribution of science to contemporary culture, they offer a framework and rationale for the 
choice and excision of content. 
Moreover, the singular emphasis on what we know without some insights into the 
methods that have led to the justification for the belief in these entities and concepts – that is 
procedural knowledge – or the constructs that are used to justify their existence and the way in 
which they are used (epistemic knowledge) – is akin to offering students a description of a great 
cathedral without any understanding of how it came to be built, or the creative achievement it 
represents. And, without any understanding of the procedural or epistemic elements of scientific 
reasoning, students will emerge from their formal education lacking a key aspect of the 
knowledge required to evaluate scientific arguments (Ryder, 2001). 
Thus, the first implication is that there needs to be a rebalancing of the curriculum. 
Mathematical and computational thinking cannot be excised. Likewise the development of 
analogical models and theories that are central to science has to be given the pre-eminence that a 
cognitive history of the sciences suggests it occupies. Moreover, the omission of any treatment of 
evolutionary accounts of the origins of species, stars, the universe, and more would be a failure 
to introduce young people to one of the major paradigms of scientific thought – in the case of 
evolution itself a paradigm of which Dobhansky famously noted that “nothing in biology mades 
sense except in the light of evolution” (Dobhansky, 1973),  and a paradigm that has become 
influential in the psychological and social sciences (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Rose & 
Rose, 2010). 
The role of taxonomy and classification in the development of science provides an 
organizing framework where disparate piece of the science curriculum – classification of life 
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forms in biology, the categorization of rocks in the earth sciences (the foundations of geology), 
the identification and separation of elements (essential to the development of the periodic table), 
and the differentiation of heat and temperature can all be seen as a mode of thought which is 
essential for progress in science. The identification of patterns – the work of the epidemiologist – 
is also fundamental to establishing potential causal relationships. In school science these can be 
studied through historical examples, or alternatively they can be modeled using exercises that 
explore relationships between eye color and hair color, reaction time and gender, or height and 
foot size. Likewise, the emergence of probabilistic thinking in the 17
th
 Century (Hacking, 1984) 
has become a style of reasoning which is fundamental to science (Fine, Goldacre, & Haines, 
2014). As a style of reasoning it can be exemplified through the collection of data sets that 
produce Gaussian distributions such as the variation in the heights of a set of students of the 
same age, the use of Punnett Squares to predict the outcomes of monohybrid and dihybrid 
crosses, and, at higher levels, statistical and quantum mechanics. 
A major focus of science is producing an answer to the causal question of why the world 
behaves as it does requiring ‘the hypothetical construction of analogical models’ and a mode of 
thinking that is pervasive to science. Students, for instance, are introduced to the physical models 
of the human body, they construct physical models of cells, they are asked to use the particle 
model of matter to explain phenomena such as condensation and evaporation, the phenomena of 
diffraction and refraction are explained using a wave model of light, the atom is represented by 
the Bohr model as a kind of mini solar system, and molecular models of chemical structures are 
used to explain ionic and covalent bonding, the properties of materials, and the nature of 
chemical reactions. Yet, despite the significance of modeling to the scientific enterprise as a style 
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of reasoning, it is rarely discussed explicitly within science education (Justi & Gilbert, 2002; 
Schwarz & White, 2005). 
The second implication is that an emphasis on styles of reasoning offers school science a 
rationale for transcending the dominance of content knowledge in the curriculum, for as long as 
content knowledge is seen as the sole organizing framework for the determination of the 
curriculum, school science will continue to struggle with an overloaded curriculum. Moreover, 
the ever-expanding body of scientific knowledge exerts more and more pressure to squeeze ever 
more concepts into a finite and limited time such that the curriculum runs the risk of becoming a 
mile wide and only microns deep.
14
 In contrast, a curriculum which saw its primary goal as a 
means of introducing students to the six major styles of reasoning in science could simply limit 
itself to a set of key examples which have established the success of scientific thought. 
Arguments for any specific aspect of scientific knowledge would have to be made not in terms of 
its importance to physics, biology, or the earth sciences, but instead on why it was key to 
illuminating and exploring one of the major modes of scientific reasoning.  
Third, students need to see not only how such modes of thought have been successful but 
also to experience and practice their use to: a) understand their value and utility for the 
production of reliable knowledge; b) to develop some basic competency in their use; and c) to 
appreciate their intellectual and cultural significance. In a society that seeks to develop students’ 
ability to reason critically, any understanding of styles and modes of reasoning is not acquired en 
passant. Rather it is acquired through systematic opportunities to engage in some of the key 
                                               
14  The superficial scratching of the scientific landscape is captured by the common use of the 
argument that there is a need to ‘cover’ the curriculum. A ‘cover’ is something which rest on the 
surface and does not permit the investigation of the underlying structure.  
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epistemic practices of the sciences, to use the entities on which such reasoning draws, and to 
engage in meta-level reflection on the process. Practice, of itself, has demonstrated “little 
effectiveness in developing any real understanding of how science works within and across fields 
and how that knowledge might relate to civic goals” (p1073)(Linn, Palmer, Baranger, Gerard, & 
Stone, 2015; Rudolph, 2014). Hence, the primary function of asking students to engage in the 
activity of scientific reasoning should be to build a deeper understanding of how such knowledge 
came to be and the intellectual achievement it represents.  This in turn requires a well-defined 
conception of the learning outcomes that engaging in practice might seek to achieve – that is the 
procedural knowledge essential for practice, the epistemic criteria by which new knowledge 
might be judged, and the forms of reasoning used in science – all of which are conjoint with 
much of the knowledge needed for civic engagement (Ryder, 2000) and all of which emerge 
from a perspective that draws on ‘styles of reasoning’.  
Fourth, in the development of our current scientific understanding of the material world, 
critique has played an essential role, for instance, in identifying why – Ptolemy’s geocentric 
universe, Lamarkianism, the ether, cold fusion, phlogiston, spontaneous generation, and many 
other ideas were ultimately flawed. As Allchin (2012) has cogently argued, “students also need 
to learn how science can go wrong” (p. 905, emphasis in original) and that establishing error is 
scientific work that can also help to deepen student understanding. Critique and argument are, 
therefore, central to learning science and there can be no attempt to teach students how to reason 
in science without providing them opportunities to review and evaluate alternative interpretations 
of data sets, experimental designs, explanatory models, or causal explanations – features which 
are notable by their absence from many, if not most, science curricula (Henderson et al., 2015). 
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Ultimately, the reader might ask why this emphasis on teaching scientific reasoning and 
its conceptualization matters? Our response is twofold. First, leaving students with the 
overwhelming impression that science is a body of unequivocal and uncontested knowledge that 
offers no space for intellectual engagement or human creativity does both the sciences and its 
students a disservice. It does the sciences a disservice by presenting them as a ‘final form’ 
(Duschl, 1990) product without any insights into the processes that led to their attainment; and it 
does students a disservice by offering them an educational experience dominated by the lower 
order cognitive challenges of recall, comprehension, and application. In contrast, recent research 
suggests that students who are challenged in their classes are more likely to feel confident, 
successful, and happy during their science classes as well as in other academic classes 
(Schneider et al., 2015). By exploring how reasoning in science is central to its practice it will be 
possible to offer a means of illuminating the intellectual creativity required to do science, and to 
cultivate the critical disposition and distaste for easy answers that is the hallmark of the scientific 
thinker. 
Our argument has been that the failure to place scientific reasoning at the center of the 
science curriculum can be attributed to the lack of clarity of its role and function in learning 
science. In short, the absence of a big picture of what it might be. To borrow from Thomas 
Kuhn’s notion of paradigms within a discipline, our limited portrayal of some of the confusion 
about the teaching of scientific reasoning would suggest that as a field we have been working in 
what Kuhn calls the period of pre-science, the period in which there is a clearly a phenomenon of 
interest, worthy of study, but no coherence or agreement about its theoretical framing within the 
community. Present knowledge is now such that the time has come, we think, for the 
establishment of a period that is more akin to normal science where the science education 
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community can coalesce around a more unified vision of the disparate nature of scientific 
reasoning, its role and function within any science education, and the knowledge bases required. 
To the question ‘which vision?’, the contention of this paper is that a focus on ‘styles of 
reasoning’ offers a good answer – in short a way out of the sea of confusion that we have 
observed looking backwards. For those who do not agree with our answer, the challenge is to 
develop a better and alternate answer. For only then, can we offer students a less-distorted 
account of the scientific enterprise and the cultural achievement it represents.  
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